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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIAIINAL LAW: Warrantless Electronic Sur-
veillance of Dissident Domestic Organizations under the National
Security Exception.
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Sinclair,' the defendants were indicted on
charges of conspiring to bomb an office of the Central Intelligence Agency
located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Following the indictment, defense
counsel filed a pretrial motion for disclosure of all records, logs and
memoranda obtained from any electronic surveillance directed at the
defendants pursuant to Alderman v. United States.2 The motion further
requested an evidentiary hearing to determine whether any evidence
upon which the indictment was based or which the Government intended
to introduce at trial was tainted by such a surveillance.3 The Supreme
Court ruled in Alderman that the Government must disclose to the
defendant all conversations to which he was a party or that occurred on
his premises that were overheard by means of any illegal electronic
surveillance." Therefore, a ruling on the legality of the surveillance was
necessary to determine what disposition should be made of Sinclair's
motion.
The issue before the court was whether the Attorney General, as
1. Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 25, 1971).
2. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
3. Weeks tv. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), gave birth to the exclusionary
rule prohibiting the admission in a federal court of any evidence gained in violation of
the defendant's fourth amendment rights. Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 285 (1920), expanded the exclusionary rule to prevent the admission of the
fruits of such illegally acquired evidence. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505(1961), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), applied the expanded
exclusionary rule to illegally overheard oral communications ruling for the first time
that the interception of oral communications constitutes a "search and seizure" within
the fourth amendment.
The question to be determined in an evidentiary hearing for taint is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suf-
ficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
4. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the practice of wiretapping and
electronic surveillance see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Osborn v. United States,
384 U.S. 323, 349 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Clark, Wiretapping and the
Constitution, 5 CALIF. WESTmxR L. REV. 1 (1968) ; Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance
By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969) ;
Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment
Framework, 50 MINN. L. REv. 378 (1965).
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an agent of the President, may authorize the warrantless eavesdropping
on dissident domestic organizations' under the guise of protecting the
"national security."'7 If the Attorney General was deemed to possess this
delegated power, then the eavesdropping would have been legal and
disclosure of the information to the defendant would not have been
required.' The ensuing arguments submitted by the Government for
such warrantless eavesdropping have also been employed in two other
recent cases.'
It is asserted by the Government that the President, as Chief
Executive, has the duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion." In accordance with that duty, he possesses the inherent con-
stitutional power to authorize warrantless eavesdropping in cases in-
volving the national security and to determine unilaterally whether
action in a given situation would be in the interest of national security.
This power is evidenced by three presidential memorandums and Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.10 The
Government further contends that pursuant to the President's duty to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution," it is "hardly unreason-
able" for him to authorize eavesdropping without a warrant in situations
involving groups considered to be threats to the existence of the Govern-
ment.1
The court in Sinclair, unable to concur with the Government's
reasoning, stated:
An idea which seems to permeate much of the Government's
argument is that dissident domestic organizations are akin
5. Unless otherwise indicated, "eavesdropping" will include wiretapping and
bugging for the purposes of this comment.
6. The defendants in Sinclair are leaders of the White Panther Party having
headquarters in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
7. The constitutionality of warrantless eavesdropping in national security cases
has not been decided by the Supreme Court. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
358 n.23 (1967). For extended discussion of this issue see Schwartz, The Legitimation of
Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. Rv.
455 (1968) ; Theoharis, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eaves-
dropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 749 (1968); Note, Eavesdropping
at the Government's Discretion-First Amendment Implications of the National
Security Eavesdropping Power, 56 CORNmL L.Q. 161 (1970); Comment, Privacy and
Political Freedom: Application of the Fourth Amendment to National Security In-
vestigations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1205 (1970).
8. Giordano v. United States. 394 U.S. 310 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
9. United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971); United States v.
Dillinger, Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 20, 1970). This case is better known as
the "Chicago Conspiracy Trial."
10. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 802, 18 U.S.C.A. §§
2510-20 (1970).
11. The fourth amendment states in part:
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 [1971], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss3/9
CASE COMMENTS
to an unfriendly foreign power and must be dealt with in the
same fashion. There is great danger in an argument of this
nature for it strikes at the very constitutional privileges and
immunities that are inherent in United States citizenship. It
is to be remembered that in our democracy all men are to
receive equal justice regardless of their political beliefs or per-
suasions. The executive branch of our government cannot be
given the power or the opportunity to investigate and prosecute
criminal violations under two different standards simply because
certain accused persons espouse views which are inconsistent
with our present form of government. 2
The court adopted the decision of United States v. Smith" which
held that "in wholly domestic situations there is no national security
exemption from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment."
The defense counsel's motion for disclosure and evidentiary hearing was
granted. 4
The purpose of this comment is to examine the legitimacy of the
Government's attempt to combine dissident domestic groups with hostile
foreign elements under the heading of "national security." A considera-
tion of the ramifications of the Sinclair decision and of the present
inability of the courts and citizenry to deter illegal eavesdropping will
also be included.
THE "NATIONAL SECURITY" DISCREPANCY
The memorandums of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Johnson
imply the existence of presidential powers to act in the interest of "nation-
al security." The confusion arises in an endeavor to characterize those
situations which are to be embodied within that category.
President Roosevelt's memorandum" to the Attorney General was
issued in response to the ominous threat to national security posed by
the Axis powers and their active supporters. In consideration of the
increasing number of " 'fifth columns' [being formed] in other countries
... in preparation for sabotage," the President authorized the Attorney
General to utilize "listening devices" to investigate "persons suspected
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...
12. United States v. Sinclair, Criminal No. 44375 (E.D. Mich., Jan. 25, 1971).
13. 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
14. Appeal docketed, No. -, 6th Cir., Feb. 15, 1971.
15. Memorandum from President Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson, May
21, 1940, on file in the Truman Library, Stephen Speingarn Papers; United States v.
Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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of subversive activities against the Government of the United States,
including spies."' 6 Roosevelt further stated, however, that he fully con-
curred with the Supreme Court's prohibition of wiretap evidence in the
"prosecution of citizens in criminal cases," agreeing that "under ordinary
and normal circumstances, wiretapping should not be carried on by the
Government for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to
abuse of civil rights."" It is clear that the utilization of "listening
devices" was not to be sanctioned in any domestic matter during time
of peace;"8 so far as relates to citizens, they were to be used only in
emergency situations when investigating spies. 9 The Roosevelt mem-
orandum remained in effect for the duration of World War II.
With the advent of peace to the world came paranoia and distrust
among the major powers. Responding to the psychological atmosphere,
Attorney General Tom C. Clark asked President Truman for a con-
tinuation of the previous administration's policy, asserting that the
emergency which had precipitated the Roosevelt policy was still in
existence.2" Mr. Clark further requested, in view of the "troubled period
in international affairs" and a "substantial increase in crime," an ex-
pansion of wiretapping to include "cases vitally affecting the domestic
security."'" This expansive request was in direct conflict with the policy
advanced by President Roosevelt. There was, however, in Mr. Clark's
reiteration of President Roosevelt's policy, no mention of Roosevelt's
abhorrence to the use of wiretapping in domestic cases "under normal
circumstances." Also deleted was the final sentence of the President's
policy which read: "You are requested furthermore to limit these in-
16. Id.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. The Communications Act of 1934 prohibited all wiretapping: "[N]o person
not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such inter-
cepted communication to any person. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). The Department
of Justice, however, has interpreted the Act as prohibiting only the interception and
divulgence and has considered interception alone to be lawful, allowing the gathering
of information for "intelligence" purposes. Brownell, The Public Security and Wire
Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197 (1954).
19. In a letter to the House Judiciary Committee in 1941, President Roosevelt
wrote:
I have no compunction in saying that wire tapping should be used against
those persons, not citizens of the United States, and those few citizens who are
traitors to their country, who today are engaged in espionage and sabotage
against the United States....
Reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm. No. i of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1941) (emphasis added).
20. Letter from Attorney General Clark to President Truman, July 17, 1946, on
file in the Truman Library, Stephen Speingarn Papers; United States v. Smith, 321
F. Supp. 424, 431 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
21. Id.
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vestigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as
possible to aliens." Evidently unaware of these deletions, President
Truman granted the Attorney General's request.22
Numerous bills were introduced in the 1950's in an attempt to
explicitly legalize wiretapping in national security cases. Debates con-
cerning these bills centered around necessity and procedure rather than
constitutional infringement. The controversy continued with the defeat of
each of these bills. In an attempt to clarify the Government's position
and "avoid any misunderstanding" concerning the extent to which
eavesdropping was to be permitted, President Johnson issued a mem-
orandum to all departmental and agency heads stating in part:
No federal personnel is to intercept telephone conversations
within the United States by any mechanical or electronic device,
without the consent of one of the parties involved, (except in
connection with investigations related to the national
security) . 4
The mere restatement of the Roosevelt exception with no qualifications
was of little assistance in resolving the controversy.
The Supreme Court in Berger v. New York,25 responding to
pressure exerted by the Congress and investigative agencies, indicated
the necessary restrictions for a "constitutional" eavesdrop. The response
was issued in a negative manner, stating the reasons for holding a New
York eavesdropping statute unconstitutional. Congress immediately acted
upon the Court's intimation that eavesdropping may be permitted within
certain restrictions by enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
22. The President, on July 17, 1947, wrote "I concur" at the foot of the Attorney
General's letter. Id.
23. See Theoharis, The "National Security" Justification for Electronic Eaves-
dropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNF L. Rzv. 749, 763-65 (1968).
24. Memorandum of the President, June 30, 1965; United States v. Smith, 321 F.
Supp. 424, 431 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
25. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
26. The suggested regulations for a "constitutional" eavesdrop were: 1) the
warrant must particularly describe the person and place to be searched and the con-
versations to be seized; 2) it must be based upon probable cause required by the fourth
amendment; 3) itimust authorize only one limited intrusion and not a series; 4) con-
tinuation of the eavesdrop period must be based upon a showing of present probable
cause; 5) there must be an automatic termination date in the event the conversation
sought is seized before the limited period of the eavesdrop ends; 6) the officer must
make a return on the warrant showing the manner of execution and the materials or
information seized; 7) use of evidence and leads obtained as a result of such eaves-
dropping should be limited solely to the investigation and prosecution of the stated
crime; 8) there must be a showing of exigency in order to avoid the requirement of
notice to the subject upon termination of the surveillance. Id.
19711
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and Safe Streets Act of 1968.2" In the words of one writer: "There
are numerous particulars in which the Court might ultimately find that
the warmth of the legislative reception exceeds the bounds of the judicial
invitation."28 Title III surely constitutes one such particular. It embraces
the regulations as proposed by the Supreme Court in Berger and includes
a national security provision similar to that embodied in the Roosevelt
memorandum.29 In addition, Title III contains the following all-inclusive
provision of questionable constitutionality."
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States
against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger
to the structure or existence of the Government.8
The mere reference, of course, to a certain constitutional power of the
President bespeaks nothing as to the actual existence of such a power.
In answer to the contention that the above provision lends support to the
Government's argument, the court stated in United States v. Smith :82
'Regardless of these exceptions in the criminal statute, the President is,
of course, still subject to the constitutional limitations imposed upon
him by the Fourth Amendment." 8
Approximately thirty years have passed since President Roosevelt's
memorandum established the original limitations of the national security
27. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
28. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Lea've of the Magistrate: The Case in
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 177 (1969).
29. The "national security" provision reads:
Nothing contained in this chanter or in section 605 of the Communications Acts
of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional powers of
the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to
obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the
United States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(3) (1970).
30. See Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order." 67 MlCH. L. Rav. 455 (1968) : Note. Wiretalping and Electronic
Surveillance-Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319
(1968). In reference to the Crime Control Act, Justice Goldberg said: "This law, along
with much needed measures to strengthen law enforcement, contains in Titles I and III
provisions which are . . . of dubious constitutionality." Goldberg, Criminal Justice in
Times of Stress, 52 J. AM. JUn. Soc'v 54 (1968).
31. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(3) (1970).
32. 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
33. Id. at 425.
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exception. During that period disturbing liberties have been taken with
that exception which pose serious constitutional questions. The original
exception to the then existing wiretap law was to be of limited duration,
lasting for the duration of the emergency which had precipitated the
policy, and was to be applied only to hostile foreign powers and their
agents in the United States. Though World War II had ended, President
Truman continued the policy and expanded it to include subversives of
any sort. President Johnson's ambiguous restriction of eavesdropping to
cases related to national security also permitted expansive interpretation.
Employing Title III as a guideline, the alleged national security excep-
tion to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
might be construed to embrace even a movement to alter the
electoral college, or more pertinently, any black militant or
radical group such as the Black Panther Party, Students for
a Democratic Society, the 'Yippies,' or any other 'subversive'
organization even though it has no credible links to a foreign
power.3 4
The Sinclair decision would appear to partially resolve the incessant
discrepancy by omitting "wholly domestic groups" from the national
security exception. A dormant definitional problem, however, is inherent
in the court's ruling. Assuming the existence of a national security
exception in espionage and other foreign intelligence cases," the dif-
ficulties involved in arriving at any cogent delineation are apparent.
What is a "wholly" domestic organization? Is a criterion of mere
citizenship of the members to be employed or shall the status of the
organization be predicated upon its source of funds and/or location of
power base? What degree of association must exist between a domestic
organization and a foreign power to alter the status of the group in the
eyes of the law? If an acceptable criterion is established, the sufficiency
of evidence in support of the required link will result in perpetual con-
troversies having no predictable solution. The decision may be used
by the Government as a justification, if one be necessary, for an in-
depth investigation of certain domestic organizations. In view of the
ever-expanding interpretation of "national security," however, the deci-
34. Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of
"Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. REv. 455, 491 (1968).
35. Implied in the Sinclair decision prohibiting warrantless eavesdropping only in
"wholly" domestic situations is that an exception in foreign cases may be permitted.
The court in Smith stated that it was not deciding as to the requirement of a warrant
in foreign intelligence cases thus permitting the implication to be drawn. 321 F. Supp.
at 426.
1971]
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sion was necessary and proper.
DOMESTIC ORGANIZATIONS AKIN TO FOREIGN POWERS?
Implicit in the arguments presented by the Government is that
domestic organizations advocating a different form of government than
that which we now have constitute the same threat as a hostile foreign
power and should be treated in the same manner. That intimation is not
in accordance with past decisions of the Supreme Court nor with the
Constitution itself. Though a domestic group may "pose a threat" to
the Government, the members of that group nevertheless retain their
constitutional rights. "[S]pies and saboteurs are as entitled to the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers .... .
In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell," the court ruled that
even in the face of an emergency constitutional powers are not increased
nor are constitutional restrictions diminished. An emergency may, how-
ever, "furnish the occasion" for the exercising of powers previously
granted by the Constitution. "
Assuming, arguendo, that an emergency of sufficient proportions
presently exists, it is of no consequence if the President does not possess
the necessary powers as granted by the Constitution. The arguments of
the Government directed at that issue contend that the President does
hold the power, not only to act in a manner he considers necessary in
the interest of national security, but also the inherent Constitutional power
to determine unilaterally what instances concern the national security.
There is no factual evidence in our history to support such a con-
tention. In fact, it was the exercising of a similar power which played
midwife to the American Revolution."
In 1761, James Otis, speaking in response to the extensive use of
general warrants authorizing searches for mere evidence,"0 stated that
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas further stated:
I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection
of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney
General assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested,
neutral magistrate.
Id. at 360.
37. 290 U.S. 398 (1933). Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), asserted
that the protection granted by the fourth amendment "reaches all alike, whether
accused of a crime or not . .. ." Id. at 393.
38. 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1933).
39. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
40. General warrants were freely issued by the Secretary of State of England
authorizing the search of private homes for books and papers which might be used to
convict their owner of seditious libel. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626
(1886).
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they were "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was
found in an English law book," since they placed "the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer."'" In response to the diatribe of
Otis, John Adams stated: "Then and there was the first scene of the first
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there
the child Independence was born."42 The heated debates concerning
general warrants culminated in their prohibition by Lord Camden in
Entick v. Carrington."8
The omnivorous and intrusive nature of eavesdropping is such that
its use, similar to that of general warrants, becomes but a search for mere
evidence.44 The intrusion resulting from eavesdropping is of a more
offensive nature than that resulting from general warrants because the
subject is completely unaware of the presence of the device and carries
on personal activities in reliance upon his privacy. To assert that those
same persons who exhibited such repugnance and disdain for general
warrants intended that the executive be endowed with the power to violate
the constitutional rights and privacy of the citizenry without any review
of probable cause by the judiciary would seem patently erroneous. It
would be of little consolation to the framers of our Constitution that an
invasion of the most intimate areas of one's home was in the interest of
national security as deemed solely by the President.
The reasons advanced for an exception to the warrant requirement
in those instances involving foreign intelligence are: 1) the decision
to employ electronic surveillance in foreign cases must evolve from
policy considerations and an assessment of previously acquired intelligence
information to which a magistrate has no access; 2) a highly judgmental
decision, outside the realm of a magistrate's knowledge and experience,
must be made as to comparative risk; and 3) the nation's interest stands
to be prejudiced by a disclosure of the decision.
Responding to the first argument, one may be assured that the
Government in all cases, domestic or foreign, will have more extensive
knowledge of the factors from which the necessity for eavesdropping has
arisen. The purpose of requiring judicial review of probable cause for a
warrant is to interject an unbiased intermediary, one detached from the
investigation, between the investigative departments of the Government
and the citizenry."2 The reason for this "buffer" is to assure the suf-
41. Quoted in id. at 625.
42. Id.
43. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).
44. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
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ficiency of the evidence and protect against the infringement of con-
stitutional rights by over-zealous law enforcement officials. It is the
unbiased and detached nature of the magistrate which allows him to
perform this function, separating that which constitutes sufficient evidence
from information amounting to mere speculation on the part of those
conducting the investigation.
The argument in support of removing the intermediary in national
security cases because of inaccessibility of information may possess a
certain amount of validity when applied to foreign intelligence situations.
The information involved in those instances is often extremely con-
fidential and vital to the security of the nation. It may be convincingly
argued that the world of espionage and counter-espionage is not within
the realm of experience and knowledge of a magistrate. In domestic
cases, however, the argument appears unacceptable. There is no classified
information in these cases which cannot be presented to the magistrate
for his decision. To decide otherwise would result in the removal of the
magistrate from that very position prescribed by the fourth amendment,
leaving no check upon the enthusiasm of the respective law enforcement
agencies to perform their duties. Without this check, constitutional
rights are in a precarious position.
The second argument is equally inapplicable to domestic cases.
The elements of "comparative risk" in foreign intelligence eavesdropping
are not indicated by the Government. One can only assume that the
risks involved would amount to such things as an impairment of existing
relations with a foreign country, possible repercussions of some form or
the possibility of an embarassing incident. It is obvious that these con-
siderations are not applicable to domestic cases. In fact, repercussions
in domestic cases may be more apt to occur when the surveillance takes
place without a warrant.4"
The third argument asserts that disclosure of the warrant hearing
decision would prejudice the national interest. It is undeniable that
eavesdropping will be virtually ineffective when the subject of the
surveillance is aware of his predicament. As to how the party will learn
of the hearing decision within time to render the surveillance ineffective
is unclear. Title III provides the procedure through which authorization
for an eavesdrop is acquired. The pertinent sections read in part:
46. J. Edgar Hoover har written:
One of the quickest ways for any law enforcement officer to bring public
disrepute upon himself, his organization and the entire profession is to be
found guilty of a violation of civil rights.
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sept., 1952.
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Each application for an order authorizing or approving the
interception of a wire or oral communication shall be made in
writing upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent
jurisdiction .... "
Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order,
as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving the
interception . 8
There is no opportunity in the procedure for the subject of the
surveillance to discover either the request or the decision concerning
the eavesdrop. Upon termination of the authorization or extension,"9
it is provided that:
Within a reasonable time but not later than ninety days . . .
the issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served, on the
persons named in the order . . . notice of the [surveillance
or of the denying of authorization] .... "
Therefore, the subject first becomes aware of the surveillance some-
time after it has terminated. If it is necessary to withhold notice from
the subject in order to maintain the effectiveness of eavesdrops in use
against related parties, Title III states that "[o]n an ex parte showing
of good cause to a judge of competent jurisdiction the serving of the
[notice] . . . may be postponed."'" The above provisions are surely
adequate to protect against any possible "prejudice to the national
interest." The Government need only show probable cause to avail itself
of these provisions.
The reasoning behind an allowance of warrantless eavesdropping
in foreign intelligence cases is inapplicable to the domestic sphere, and
any attempt to equate the two categories is improper. While the Govern-
ment has broad discretionary powers in the foreign arena, activity in the
affairs of domestic groups is limited. As stated by the court in United
States v. Smith, 2 "limitations which are artificial in the international
sphere are reasonable and proper when solely domestic subversion is
involved." 3
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(1) (1970).
48. Id. § 2518(3) (emphasis added).
49. Extension of the time limit upon authorization may be granted if proper
application is made and probable cause is demonstrated. Id. § 2518(5).
50. Id. § 2518(8) (d). For a discussion of this provision see Note, Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance-Title III of the Crime Control Act of r968, 23 RUTGERS L.
REv. 368 (1968).
51. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(8) (d) (1970).
52. 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
53. Id. at 430.
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INABILITY TO PREVENT ILLEGAL EAVESDROPPING
A distressing situation evidenced by the Sinclair and Smith decisions
is the inability of the courts to prevent illegal eavesdropping. 4 The
general public and the courts are in somewhat the same predicament,
each possessing but one deterrent to illegal surveillances.
The weapon held by the courts is the "exclusionary rule" which
prohibits any use of evidence gained in violation of a defendant's fourth
amendment rights in a federal court proceeding.5 The full effectiveness
of that rule, however, is hampered by the difficulties in its application.
As indicated by the Government, a magistrate has no knowledge of nor
access to much of the surreptitiously acquired information possessed by
the Government. How then, if a motion for disclosure is granted as in
the instant case, is a judge to determine when all illegally monitored
conversations of the defendant have been revealed to him? An evidentiary
hearing to determine what evidence has been tainted by an illegal
surveillance requires an in camera disclosure to the court of all evidence
possessed by the Government which pertains to the defendant. The
question arises as to how a magistrate is to ascertain when all such
evidence has been revealed to the court. The court is forced to rely upon
the good faith of the Government which, in view of the past, is an un-
enviable position for the defendant." The rule also applies only to
evidence which is intended to be introduced at trial. If no such attempt
is made, the court can do nothing in respect to the illegal survelliance"
The only deterrent available to the citizenry is a civil action for
damages resulting from an invasion of one's privacy. This device has met
little success and therefore is seldom utilized. In fact, during the thirty-
54. The court in Smith stated:
It is true that the court has only limited power to prevent [warrantless
surveillances in domestic cases]. Due to the limitations of the exclusionary
rule, at the present time courts are, for practical purposes, powerless to
prevent unconstitutional searches of any type, when there is no attempt to
use the information gained from that search in a subsequent court proceeding.
321 F. Supp. at 430.
55. See cases cited note 3 supra; but cf. United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1970). Schipani ruled that where illegally seized evidence is reliable and
clear and has not been gathered for the express purpose of improperly influencing the
sentencing judge, there is no error in using it in connection with fixing sentence. 435
F2d at 28.
56. Numerous instances involving the interception of privileged communications, the
submission of "either phony or patently inadequate affidavits" and the conscious
violation of the law by the Government have been compiled in Schwartz, The Legitima-
tion of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MIcH. L.
REv. 455 (1968).
57. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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eight years in which the Communications Act of 193458 was in effect,
there was not one successful suit brought under the criminal sanctions
of section 605 of that act.5 It is apparent that a party who has not
suffered any monetary loss by an invasion of his privacy might be
unwilling to proceed with the inconvenience of litigation. One convicted
of a crime will have little chance of convincing a jury that he has
suffered remediable damages during the search which revealed his
criminal activities. Criminal prosecution of a police officer in these cases
will also be unlikely because a prosecutor would be unwise to impair his
relations with the police with whom he must work so closely.
Title III embraces a provision for civil damages which concludes
with the following sentence:
A good faith reliance on a court order or on [the belief that
a proper emergency exists that requires interception before the
authority can be granted] shall constitute a complete defense
to any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter. "
In the face of that disclaimer, few persons would consider their chances
of success in a suit against an officer to be sufficient to make the time
and money expended worthwhile.
It has been asserted that the reality and content of constitutional
rights are determined by the available remedies and enforcement
devices.0 If that is true, the right of privacy is reduced to a mere platonic
abstraction. The possible ramifications of the present situation were
well stated by Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar
Hoover in a speech in 1952.
Our people may tolerate many mistakes of both intent and per-
formance, but, with unerring instinct, they know that when
any person is intentionally deprived of his constitutional rights,
those responsible have committed no ordinary offense. A crime
of this nature, subtly encouraged by failure to condemn and
punish, certainly leads down the road to totalitarianism."
CONCLUSION
The controversy concerning eavesdropping under the heading of
58. 47 U.S.C. § 605. See note 18 supra.
59. R. CIPES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 5.02(3) (1969).
60. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520 (1970).
61. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil
Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 12 (1950).
62. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sept., 1952.
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-"national security" has continued since the inception of the provision in
1940. The application of the fourth amendment to eavesdropping"3 has
but shifted the debates from eavesdropping in general under the national
security exception to warrantless eavesdropping under the same heading.
While the Supreme Court has been restricting eavesdropping, the legis-
lature and investigative agencies have expanded its legal usage. From an
investigative technique to be used against spies and saboteurs, eaves-
dropping under national security seems to have been expanded to a
repressive measure utilized against those who may bring displeasure to
the Government.6" The Sinclair decision may be viewed as an indication
that the courts will no longer acquiesce in such an expansion.
There is no valid reason why the Government cannot comply with
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. At the time President
Roosevelt issued his celebrated memorandum, all wiretapping by any
person was held to be illegal. 5 The President's only recourse was to
authorize an exception to the existing law. With the passage of Title
III, permitting eavesdropping with a warrant in numerous instances,6
there no longer exists a valid reason for the continuance of illegal in-
vestigations. The Government need only establish probable cause and
authorization or approval will be granted." If the exigency of the
situation is such that acquiring a warrant would delay the surveillance
until it was ineffective, the surveillance may be carried out without a
warrant, provided an application for authorization is filed "within 48
hours after the interception has occurred, or begins to occur.""8 If an
extension of the time limit placed on a surveillance is necessary, the
Government need only show probable cause for such an extension.69
The recurring assertion that the activities of the Government
serve to protect the Constitution seems ironical. Indeed, the argument
that a government can protect constitutional rights by infringing upon
those rights is, at best, illogical. In United States v. Robel,° the
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(surveillance of members of the Black Panther Party) ; United States v. Dillinger,
Criminal No. CR 180 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 20, 1970) (surveillance of the leaders of the
Students for a Democratic Society and the Yippies); N.Y. Times, June 5, 1969, at
27, col. 1 (surveillance of the late Dr. Martin Luther King).
65. See note 18 supra.
66. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (1970).
67. "It is practically unheard of for a judge to fail to grant a wiretap order for
the district attorney." S. DASH, R. KNOWLTON & R. SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS
45 (1959).
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(7) (1970).
69. Id. § 2518(5).
70. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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Supreme Court considered this precise situation:
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense,
we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties-
the freedom of association-which makes the defense of the
Nation worthwhile. 1
The ideals of Robel have been sustained by Sinclair. The suppression
of the civil liberties of dissident domestic groups in the name of national
security will not be tolerated.
ADDENDUM
On April 8, 1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the holding of the district court
granting the defendant's motion for disclosure and ordering an evidenti-
ary hearing at the conclusion of the trial.
The majority stated:
The government has not pointed to, and we do not find, one
written phrase in the Constitution, in the statutory law, or in
the case law of the United States, which exempts the President,
the Attorney General, or federal law enforcement from the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment in the case at hand. It
is clear to us that Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act . . . refrained from attempting to convey
to the President any power which he did not already possess.
Essentially, the government rests its case upon the inherent
powers of the President as Chief of State to defend the existence
of the State. We have already shown that this very claim was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) .... 71
The court explicitly refrained from deciding the extent of the President's
lawful powers under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy, and whether the case presented facts which might have
constituted probable cause for issuance of a prior or subsequent warrant
for eavesdropping.
Judge Weick, the lone dissenter, was of the opinion that Alderman
did not require an adversary proceeding and full disclosure in all cases,
examination by a magistrate in camera being sufficient in cases of a non-
71. Id. at 262.
72. United States v. Sinclair, No. 71-1105 (6th Cir., April 8, 1971) (citation
omitted).
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complex nature. Since the sealed exhibits in the instant case contained
but a few pages, it was asserted that an in camera hearing was the
proper procedure to be employed. Judge Weick saw no danger in allowing
the President and the Attorney General to act without judicial review
of probable cause, stating:
I see no reason why the powers of the President should be
any different in dealing with either foreign or domestic sub-
versives; both or either could result in the destruction of the
government."3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGION: Amish Exempted from
Wisconsin Compulsory Education Statute.
INTRODUCTION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in State v. Yoder,' reversed the
convictions of three Amish fathers who refused to comply with the
Wisconsin Compulsory School Attendance Law.' This statute requires
a child's attendance at either a public or private school until the age of
sixteen. The fathers refused to send their children to school claiming
that to do so would violate basic tenets of their religion. In reversing
the 1969 convictions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has become the
first major court to declare that a compulsory school attendance law is
an unconstitutional infringement upon the first amendment rights of the
Amish in the free exercise of their religion.8
THE APPLICATION OF THE SHERBERT DOCTRINE
In arriving at their decision in the Yoder case, the majority relied
73. Id.
1. 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S.
April 1, 1971) (No. 1536).
2. Wis. SrAT. ANN. § 118.15 (1968).
3. The Amish were also victorious in the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v.
Petersheim, 70 Pa. D. & C. 432 (Somerset County Ct. 1949), appeal dismissed, 166 Pa.
Super. 90, 70 A.2d 395 (1950), which was decided on similar facts. The Pennsylvania
court discussed the flag salute case, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940), and concluded that "the trend of the recent and modern decisions is in favor
of the religious liberty of the individual when it comes in conflict with a State law,
ordinance or regulation." 70 Pa. D. & C. at 442. This case has stood alone and has
never been expressly overruled.
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substantially on the doctrine espoused by the Supreme Court in Sherbert
v. Verner." The Sherbert decision held that the denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work
on Saturdays interfered with the free exercise of her religion. The
Supreme Court based its decision on a broad interpretation of the free
exercise clause, ruling that the first amendment protected not only the
religious beliefs of the individual but also guaranteed the right to engage
in ritualistic worship.'
The Sherbert doctrine consists of a two-step procedure to be
employed when confronted with an issue involving the free exercise
clause. The first inquiry is whether the challenged statute interferes with
the constitutional freedom to act in accordance with one's sincere re-
ligious beliefs;' the second inquiry is, if there is such interference,
whether there is a compelling state interest which would warrant such
infringement.7
In applying the first segment of the Sherbert doctrine to the Yoder
case,8 the majority resorted to an extensive examination of evidence
presented concerning the Amish religious beliefs. The evidence tended
to show that the Amish allowed their children to obtain an eighth grade
education since they felt that the basic subjects taught in the public grade
schools were of some value to their children. However, the Amish
objected to the "worldliness" of the public high schools and refused
to allow their children to attend them. The Amish maintained that the
public high schools were concerned with preparing children to achieve
success in a society from which they wished to withdraw. They preferred
to have their children spend their post eighth grade years at home where
the children would be able to engage in a more intensive study of the Bible
and the Amish religious beliefs. Tradition required this intensive study
to help prepare the child to decide whether or not he wished to accept
adult baptism at the age of eighteen.9 Based on this evidence, the court
decided that the Amish refusal to comply with compulsory education
was grounded on their religious beliefs and that to coerce the Amish into
4. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5. This concept seems to have its contemporary genesis in the case of Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where it was stated that the free exercise clause
"embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regula-
tion. .. ." Id. at 303-04.
6. 374 U.S. at 403.
7. Id. at 406.
8. 182 N.W.2d at 540-42.
9. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1971, at 29, col. 8.
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sending their children to a public high school would infringe upon the
free exercise of their religion.'0
The majority then applied the second segment of the Sherbert
doctrine: the infringement may be justified only if it is needed to protect
a "compelling state interest." Although the majority concluded that
compulsory education was of "supreme importance,"" they reasoned
that "compulsory education ... in itself is not a compelling state interest
although it is within the state power to regulate."' 2  This decision, that
education is not a compelling state interest, is unique for the bulk of
authority has historically held to the contrary."
WEAKNESSES OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
It is submitted that the majority opinion is premised on two possible
misconceptions: 1) the belief that there was substantial infringement
upon free exercise of the Amish religion" (i.e., the first test of the
Sherbert doctrine) ;5 2) the conclusion that compulsory education was
not a compelling state interest 16 (i.e., the second test of the Sherbert
doctrine) ."7
Infringement of Free Exercise
In examining the extent of the infringement upon the Amish
religious beliefs, Chief Justice Hallows articulated the reasons for the
Amish aversion to the public high schools:
To the Amish, secondary schools not only teach an unaccept-
able value system but they also seek to integrate ethnic
groups into a homogenized society, resulting in a psychological
alienation of Amish children from their parents and great
harm to the child....
* * *There is another impact on the Amish children
themselves if they are required to go to high school. They
would experience a useless anguish of living in two worlds.
10. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
11. Id. at 543.
12. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
13. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ; Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ; State v.
Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super.
462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951). For additional supportive authority see Galanter, Religious
Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 229 n.70.
14. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
15. 374 U.S. at 403.
16. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
17. 374 U.S. at 406.
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Either the education they receive in the public school is irrele-
vant to their lives as members of the Old Order Amish or
these secondary school values will make life as Amish impos-
sible."8
The Compulsory School Attendance Law requires attendance at
either a public or private high school until the age of sixteen. 9 Although
the majority noted that the Amish are opposed to private as well as
public high schools,2" they discussed only the reasons why compelling
the Amish to attend public schools would be undesirable. The opinion
failed to analyze, however, how serious an infringement the alternative
of a private high school would be on the Amish religious beliefs. The
arguments directed against the public high schools would lose much, if
not all, of their relevance if applied to a private Amish high school.
Such a private high school would be able to shun the "worldliness" of
its public counterparts; it could teach an acceptable value system as
opposed to the "unacceptable value system" which confronts the Amish
children attending public high schools; these children would no longer
be forced to experience "a useless anguish of living in two worlds."'"
In addition to avoiding the major Amish objections to the public high
schools, such a private high school would also further the intent of the
Act by educating the children in all of the required courses. By only
analyzing the adverse effects of compulsory attendance at a public high
school, the majority, therefore, discounted what perhaps would have been
a desirable alternative-the private high school.22
In support of the majority, however, it may be stated that even
granting the Amish the alternative of attending private schools would
still infringe on the free exercise of their religion. The Amish feel that
any education past the eighth grade is unnecessary and unsuitable in
relation to their chosen station in life-that of farmers and home-
makers.2" They shun the progressive ways of modern American society
and maintain that post eighth grade education, public or private, is not
only inappropriate but would actually undermine the tenets of their
religion. 4
18. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
19. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1) (1968).
20. 182 N.W.2d at 541.
21. Id. at 542.
22. The dissenting opinion, however, did consider a private school. Id. at 547.
23. See generally Note, The Right Not to be Modern Men: The Amish and
Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REv. 925, 940-41 (1967).
24. The case of Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951),
was decided in favor of compulsory education on similar facts. In support of their
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If the Amish did choose to attend private schools, such schools
might still have to satisfy the basic standards as set forth by the state.25
These requirements usually involve the offering of "basic" substantive
courses. The Amish, however, regard the subject matter of many re-
quired high school courses as actually sinful. "The Amish shun such
things as art and literature, because they are conducive to individual
pride and tend to conflict with the simple and humble life which the
Amish believe God demands. The study of science tends to conflict with
their literalistic interpretation of scripture." 6 Despite the fact that this
alternative might not have been a viable solution, the failure of the
majority to discuss it was detrimental to the logic of their opinion.
Justice Heffernan, in his dissenting opinion, advocated "an Amish
vocational school which will teach reading, agriculture, and husbandry,
and whatever religious precepts the Amish community desires"27 as a
means of reconciling the conflict between the Amish and the compulsory
education law. The state legislatures of Kansas and Pennsylvania have
modified the compulsory attendance laws of their respective states to
allow for the implementation of a plan similar to that advocated by
Justice Heffernan.2" These modifications were prompted by decisions
objections to compulsory education in general and past eighth grade education in
particular, the Amish "bishops" submitted to the court the following "Statement of
Position of Old Order Amish Church Regarding Attendance In Public Schools" which
states in part:
We believe that our children have attained sufficient schooling when they have
passed the eighth grade of the elementary school. . . . We believe than [sic]
our children have passed the eighth grade that in our circumstances, way of
of life and religious belief, we are safeguarding their home and church
training in secular and religious belief and faith by keeping them at home
under the influence of their parents.
Id. at 136. See generally Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning
Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217.
25. 182 N.W.2d at 550. Accommodation in formulating such basic requirements
to various religious beliefs have been made in other states. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-111
(Supp. 1970) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1330 (Supp. 1970).
26. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A
Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REv. 423, 426-27 (1968).
27. 182 N.W.2d at 550.
28. The Kansas statute presently reads:
A child attending secondary schools in this state shall not be required to par-
ticipate in any activity which is contrary to the religious teachings of such
child, if a written statement signed by one of the parents or the guardian of
such child is filed with the proper authorities of the school attended, requesting
that the child not be required to participate in such activties and stating the
reason for such request.
When a recognized church or religious denomination that objects to a
regular public high school education provides, either individually or in co-
operation with another recognized church or religious denomination, offers
and teaches a regularly supervised program of instruction, approved by the
state board of education for children of compulsory school attendance age
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handed down by the Kansas Supreme Court" and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court.3" Each of these courts, however, held that the state
compulsory school attendance laws as applied to the Amish were con-
stitutional.
After noting these legislative enactments, the majority concluded
their opinion: "These legislative exemptions evince the fact the important
goals of education can be attained by alternative forms of regulation
without infringing first amendment rights."'" After making the re-
ference to "alternative forms of regulation" which do not infringe
upon religious beliefs, the majority failed to pursue the possibility of
private education to any logical conclusion. Instead of attempting to
analyze the merits of such education, the majority concluded the
opinion without further discussion.
The Compelling State Interest
The majority states that compulsory education is not a compelling
state interest.3' The phrase "compelling state interest" originated in the
case of Sherbert v. Verner." However, the guidelines which the court
established were insufficient for any adequate determination of what
constitutes a "compelling state interest."
The only insight offered to resolve this definitional problem was
who have successfully completed the eighth grade, participation in such a
program of instruction by children who have successfully completed the
eighth grade and whose parents or guardians are members of the sponsoring
church or religious denomination shall be regarded as acceptable school
attendance within the meaning of this act.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (Supp. 1970).
The Pennsylvania statute presently reads:
The provisions of this act requiring regular attendance shall not apply to a
child who-
(4) Has attained the age of fourteen (14) years and is engaged in farm work
or domestic service in a private home on a permit issued as provided in clause
(3) of this section, and who has satisfactorily completed, either in public or
private schools, the equivalent of the highest grade of the elementary school
organization prevailing in the public schools of the district in which he
resides, if the issuance of such a permit has first been recommended by the
district superintendent of schools having supervision of the schools of the
district where such child resides, or by the principal of the private school where
such child is enrolled, and the reason therefor has been approved by the
Superintendent of Public Instruction.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1330(4) (Supp. 1970).
29. State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966).
30. Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).
31. 182 N.W.2d at 547.
32. Id. at 542.
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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[i]t is basic that no showing merely of a rational relation-
ship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this
highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o] nly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation."3
The majority in Yoder simply stated that no "compelling state interest"
existed and offered no supportive authority to sustain their ruling.
They defined a "compelling state interest" to be "not just a general
interest in the subject matter but the need to apply the regulation
without exception to attain the purposes and objectives of the legis-
lation." 5
This definition as offered by the Yoder court is arguably more
restrictive than the definition proposed in Sherbert. It is more restrictive
in that should a compelling state interest be found, no exception would
be allowed.36 There are two views as to the interpretation of Sherbert
concerning such exception. The first view states that once the presence of
a compelling state interest is established, it is then determined whether
the granting of an exception will seriously impair the interests of the
state." This would imply that a compelling state interest can exist yet
an exception to it can be carved out.
The second view maintains that if an exception can be made without
subverting the purpose of the statute, no compelling state interest exists,
i.e., there can be no exception to a compelling state interest." It is
this latter view which the Yoder court adopts. 9 However, it is arguable
that the Yoder definition is more expansive than the one offered in
Sherbert in that it seems to require less demanding criteria to establish
a compelling state interest. The Sherbert doctrine requires something
more than a "colorable state interest;" it seems to require "paramount
interests" of the state. In contrast, Yoder speaks only of an interest which
is more than a general interest which would allow no exception. It is
34. Id. at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
35. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
36. Id.
37. There evolves from this decision a two-fold test which must be met in
order to sustain any law which imposes a burden on the free exercise of
religion. Such burden must be removed unless (1) there is a compelling state
interest to the contrary and (2) the state interest will, in fact, be seriously
impaired by granting the exemption.
10 VILL. L. REV. 337, 339 (1965). See also Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United
States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 280.
38. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and The Old Order Amish: A
Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REv. 423, 429-31 (1968). See also Galanter,
Religiouts Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 280.
39. 182 N.W.2d at 542.
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possible to envision an interest which is more than a general state
interest, but less than a paramount interest, yet which would allow no
exception.4" Such an interest could qualify for protection under Yoder
but fail to satisfy the Sherbert criteria.
The case law and literature evidence the confusion surrounding the
illusive concept of compelling state interest. 1  The phrase defies
mechanical application. It has therefore been incumbent upon the in-
dividual judge to make a subjective determination as to what is a "com-
pelling state interest." As a result, it is difficult to support or refute such
a determination. To illustrate, consider the arguments of the majority
and dissent in Yoder. The majority supported their contention with
quotations from two cases which could have been cited in support of a
belief to the contrary. "The American people have always regarded
education and the acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme impor-
tance which should be diligently promoted."43  After ruling that compul-
sory education was not a "compelling state interest" but was a "matter of
supreme importance," the majority declined to differentiate between the
two concepts.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Heffernan quoted the following
statement from Brown v. Board of Education :
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recogniton of the importance of education to our demo-
cratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it
40. Exemptions will generally be denied if any substantial harm may result to
either the persons involved or any third parties. 182 N.W.2d at 544.
41. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and The Old Order Amish: A
Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. Rv. 423 (1968); Galanter, Religious
Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point., 1966 WIs. L. REv. 217; Note, The
Right Not be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REv.
925 (1967); 32 GEO. WASH. L. Rtv. 307 (1963); 49 IOWA L. REv. 952 (1964) ; 43
ORE. L. REV. 177 (1964) ; 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 426 (1964); 16 VAND. L. REV. 1235
(1963) ; 10 VILL. L. REv. 337 (1965).
42. 182 N.W2d at 543.
43. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."5
The majority cited their own edited version of this quotation in support
of the conviction that compulsory education was important but not a
compelling state interest.4" They also observed that when Chief Justice
Warren made that statement he was supporting the value of education
in modern American society. Since the Amish regard this modern
American society as evil and desire to withdraw from it, the majority
determined that this quotation lost much of its forcefulness.17
Application of the "'Yoder Doctrine"
The Yoder doctrine dictates that once it is determined that no
compelling state interest exists, it must then be decided whether an
exemption to the statute can be granted to the petitioners:4" Assuming,
arguendo, that the Yoder approach is correct, the question then becomes:
if an exemption is granted to the Amish, will the purpose of the Com-
pulsory School Attendance Law be subverted? In arriving at an answer
to this question, we must consider what effect such an exemption would
have upon society as a whole and the Amish child as an individual. It
is submitted that an exemption extended to the Amish would not defeat
the purpose of compulsory education. The educational system would
continue to function, and it would continue to develop the "responsible
and productive citizens" which are the basis of good government and
a healthy society. However, if the number of poorly educated people
should substantially increase, there would be a corresponding increase
in the burden placed on society to provide for such people. Since this
ruling may affect 50,000 Amish in nineteen states and undoubtedly will
be cited in cases brought by other religious groups seeking similar
exemptions, 9 it is possible that a significant number of children may be
denied a good education and become potentially burdensome on society.
The effect of compulsory education upon the individual child must
be studied from two viewpoints: that of the child who eventually leaves
the Amish community and that of the child who remains a member of
the community.
For the child who chooses to remain in the Amish community, the
lack of a formal education is less of a problem. He is absorbed into a
45. Id. at 493.
46. 182 N.W.2d at 543.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 544.
49. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1971, at 29, col. 7.
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community of his peers and arguably suffers no detriment." However,
it is a fact that large numbers of young Amish leave their community
every year.5 If they are not compelled to attend school after the eighth
grade, these young people will be faced with the alternative of living in
a society of which they no longer desire to be a part or joining a society
for which they are not intellectually prepared. The court did not acknow-
ledge the persuasiveness of this argument and determined that granting
an exception to the Amish would not subvert the purposes of the Com-
pulsory Education Statute.2
If the state could have established a "compelling state interest" in
maintaining compulsory education, the "least means" language of Sher-
bert5" and Braunfeld v. Brown5" would seem to mandate that the
method chosen to implement such interest must be the least imposing of
all feasible alternatives. Perhaps a viable alternative would be to allow
the creation of Amish vocational schools at the expense of the Amish.
Not only will the creation of such schools be a less imposing alternative
on the Amish beliefs, but the granting of such an option has been
constitutionally required.5 This would also be an acceptable solution
under the Wisconsin statute.5" In addition to benefiting those young
Amish who do decide to leave the community, an Amish vocational high
school could teach subjects which would benefit the individual directly
and the Amish community indirectly. Since such schools would be con-
troled by the Amish, they could more readily avoid the subjects and the
distasteful "worldliness" which are offensive to their religious beliefs."'
It would benefit both those who leave the community and those who
remain.
CONCLUSION
The controlling authority and focal point of all confusion appears
to be Sherbert v. Verner. It superficially requires a two-step test: 1)
does the statute infringe upon first amendment rights, and 2) is there
50. See generally J. HosrTELmE, AwaSH SocM-ry (1963).
51. Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and The Old Order Amish:
A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REv. 423, 434 n.51 (1968).
52. 182 N.W.2d at 544.
53. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
54. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
55. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
56. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1) (1968).
57. They would still have to meet, however, the basic requirements for accredita-
tion as set forth by the state. Perhaps further accommodation could be made as
proposed by statutes promulgated in Kansas and Pennsylvania. See note 28 supra and
accompanying text.
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a compelling state interest to warrant such infringements? However, also
hidden within the Sherbert rhetoric is language relating to the "least
means" test3 8 and to the granting of "exemptions" from the compelling
state interest rule. 9 The problem posed in Yoder in light of the ambigu-
ous standards of Sherbert may admit no easy solution. It is hoped that
the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to the petitioners and through
the Yoder case attempt to more carefully crystalize the elements and
application of the "Sherbert doctrine."
CRIMINAL LAW: California's "Vicarious Murder Theory" Extends
Felony-Murder Doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The past few years have produced many well-reasoned decisions
which have limited a felon's responsibility for a killing committed by
his intended victim.' The antiquated felony-murder rule, which has been
under fire since its inception in this country, has recently been held
inapplicable to situations where either the victim or an independent
third party committed the killing during the perpetration of a felony.'
Despite this very definite trend, the Supreme Court of California
in Taylor v. Superior Court' held the defendant responsible for the
death of his co-felon, even though the deceased was killed by the wife
of the intended victim. In the Taylor case, the defendant and his co-
felons attempted to rob a liquor store. While the defendant sat in the
getaway car, his armed accomplices, Daniels and Smith, entered the
premises and pointed their guns at the owner of the liquor store who
was standing behind the counter. Daniels "chattered insanely" and
threatened to execute the owner on the spot if the money was not
delivered immediately. Smith, according to the testimony, looked "intent"
and "apprehensive" as if "waiting for something big to happen." While
Daniels was forcing the owner to the floor behind the counter, the
58. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
59. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
1. See Comment, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 591, 598-602 (1970); 21 SYRAcUSE L. REv.
1321 (1970).
2. See People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442
(1965) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
3. 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
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owner's wife, who was standing on a ladder and apparently hidden from
the robbers' view, drew a pistol from beneath her clothing and shot
and killed Smith while wounding Daniels. Refusing to reverse the
decision of the superior court, the supreme court held Taylor guilty
of the murder of his co-felon.
COUNTERVAILING FELONY-MURDER CONSIDERATIONS
By attributing the death of the felon to the acts of his co-felons
when the actual killing was done by one directly opposed to the felony,
the Supreme Court of California side-stepped one of its previous decisions
and ignored two landmark cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which have been heralded for providing a logical limitation
to the felony-murder rule and are being followed by other jurisdictions.'
In People v. Washington,' the defendant attempted to rob a gasoline
station. While he was ransacking the deposit vault, his accomplice
entered an adjacent office and pointed a revolver at the owner. Without
hesitation the owner shot and killed the felon and subsequently wounded
the defendant. Upon appeal from the superior court, the Supreme Court
of California, recognizing that the basic issue was "whether a robber
can be convicted of murder for the killing of any person by another who
is resisting the robbery,"' reversed a conviction of murder against the
defendant.
In refusing to apply the felony-murder rule in such a situation, the
Washington court explained that malice aforethought is not attributed
to the robber when a killing is committed by his victim since the killing
is not committed by the robber in the perpetration of the robbery. Indeed,
in such a case the killing is committed to thwart a felony. If this aspect
were included within the California felony-murder rule, it would expand
the meaning of such a rule beyond common understanding.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to hold felons responsi-
ble for the death of their co-felon in Commonwealth v. Redline.' The
4. See 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1496 (1965); 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 122 (1970); 71
HARV. L. REV. 1565 (1958); 25 MD. L. REv. 356 (1965); 56 MICH. L. REv. 1197 (1958);
24 Mo. L. REv. 266 (1959); 5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 172 (1965) ; 18 STAN. L. REv. 690
(1966) ; 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1321 (1970). Contra, State v. Kress, 105 N.J. Super.
514, 253 A.2d 481 (1970), discussed and criticized in Comment, 24 RUTGERS L. REv.
591 (1970).
5. 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
6. Id. at 780, 402 P.2d at 132-33, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
7. Id., 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445. Section 189 of the California Penal
Code deals with the degrees of murder: "All murder . . . which is committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem
... is murder of the first degree." CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970).
8. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
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felon was shot and killed by a police officer while attempting to escape
from the scene of the robbery. The court reasoned that the homicide was
justifiable and could not support a charge of murder on any rational
legal theory. In essence, it could not understand how anyone could have
a criminal charge lodged against him for the consequences of the lawful
conduct of another person.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed the Redline decision
in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers," holding that robbers were
not guilty of a homicide when their victim, in self-defense, shot at his
assailants and accidentally killed an innocent bystander. The court ve-
hemently refused to hold felons responsible for a killing committed by
anyone opposed to the felony and denied the applicability of the felony-
murder rule in such situations: "[We] want to make clear how shaky
are the basic premises on which [the felony-murder rule] rests. With so
weak a foundation, it behooves us not to extend it further and indeed,
to restrain it within the bounds it has always known."'"
The rationale of the California and Pennsylvania courts in these
decisions reflects the policy that it would be unjust, according to criminal
law methods of measuring culpability, to impose upon robbers the
penalty of murder not on the basis of any difference in their own con-
duct, but solely on the basis of the response by others that the robber's
conduct happened to induce. 2 While the courts recognized that there
would always be a possibility that the victim of a robbery would resist
and kill, they refused to discriminate among robbers by punishing some
for largely fortuitous circumstances. As one commentator has said:
It seems preferable . . . to impose liability only for homicides
resulting from acts done in furtherance of the felony. A
closer causal connection between the felony and the killing than
the proximate cause theory normally applicable to tort cases
should be required because of the extreme penalty attaching
to the conviction for felony murder and the difference between
the underlying rationales of criminal and tort law.'"
The Redline, Myers and Washington decisions clearly signify a
9. Id. at 507, 137 A.2d at 483.
10. 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
11. Id. at 228, 261 A.2d at 555.
12. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442,445 (1965).
13. 71 H~Av. L. REv. 1565 (1958), quoted in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v.
Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 232, 261 A.2d 550, 557 (1970).
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rejection of the proximate cause theory 4 that would hold felons respon-
sible for all deaths occurring during the felony. The present criticism of
the proximate cause theory was initiated in the Redline opinion. The
court pointed out that the assumed analogy between criminal causation
and the tort liability requirement of proximate cause was not conclusive;
if it were, then the doctrine of supervening cause, which had been
entirely disregarded, would have to be considered by the jury."5
The Myers decision went even further in disputing the applicability
of the proximate cause theory of liability in criminal cases. Although
the court recognized that precedent could be found for application of
the tort law concept of proximate cause in fixing responsibility for
criminal homicide, it could find no rational basis for its use in deter-
mining criminal liability, especially after the marked expansion of civil
liability of defendants in tort actions for negligence. The court felt that
persistence in applying the tort liability concept of proximate cause to
prosecutions for criminal homicide under such circumstances would be
to extend possible criminal liability to persons chargeable with unlawful
or reckless conduct in situations not generally considered to present the
likelihood of a resultant death."8
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California seemed to reject the
proximate cause theory in the Washington decision when it held that:
"it is not enough that the killing was a risk reasonably to be foreseen
and that the robbery might therefore be regarded as a proximate cause
of the killing."" It is evident, therefore, that the courts have become
increasingly reluctant to use the proximate cause theory in establishing
the necessary causal relation between the robber's conduct and a death
ensuing from the robbery.
RATIONALE OF THE TAYLOR COURT MAJORITY
In an apparent attempt to overcome the trend away from application
of the felony-murder rule, the California Supreme Court, in the Taylor
case, based a murder conviction on the vicarious responsibility of the co-
felons. While tacitly agreeing with the Washington holding that to impose
upon a robber an additional penalty for a fortuitous killing might be
14. A common expression of the proximate cause theory of criminal liability is:
If one or more persons set in motion a chain of circumstances out of which
death ensues, those persons must be held responsible for any death which by
direct, by almost inevitable sequence, results from such unusual criminal act.
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 516, 137 A2d 472, 489 (1958).
15. Id. at 505, 137 A.2d at 481.
16. 438 Pa. at 232, 261 A.2d at 557.
17. 62 Cal. 2d at 781, 402 P.2d at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
1971]
et al.: Constitutional Law–Cirminal Law: Warrantless Electronic Surveilla
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1971
680 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
unjust when not based on any difference in the conduct of the robber,
the court, looking to dictum in Washington,8 ruled that where there
was a difference in conduct, criminal liability for a killing committed by
a resisting victim or police officer would be determined by an inquiry
into whether the conduct of the defendant or his accomplice was sufficient-
ly provocative of lethal resistance to support a finding of implied malice.'"
Prior to the Taylor decision, the California "vicarious murder theory"
seemed to hold that robbers would not be responsible for killings per-
formed by their victim unless the robbers had committed malicious acts,
in addition to the acts constituting the underlying robbery, which dem-
onstrated culpability beyond that of other robbers.'"
Until the Taylor decision, such "additional malicious acts" were
limited to situations in which the defendant had either initiated a gun
battle," used an innocent party as a shield" or attempted to disarm a police
officer." Although the defendant and his accomplices did not perform
any of these acts, the California Supreme Court held that Daniels'
repeated threats and Smith's nervous apprehension were sufficiently
provocative of lethal resistance to lead a reasonable man to conclude
that Daniels and Smith "initiated" the gun battle, or that such conduct
was done with "conscious disregard for human life and with natural
consequences dangerous to human life."'"
THE DISSENT
The minority faction in the Taylor case, a 4-3 decision, filed a
lengthy and vigorous dissenting opinion. Without taking exception to a
"vicarious murder theory" itself, the dissenters adamantly maintained
that such a theory was not applicable to the Taylor case since they believed
that the robbers had not committed any malicious acts in addition to
the acts which constituted the underlying felony. As Justice Mosk pointed
out:
Indeed, the crime cannot be committed without making or
carrying out a threat of violence: it is code law that "Robbery
18. Id. at 782, 402 P2d at 133-34, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
19. 3 Cal. 3d at 584, 477 P.2d at 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
20. Id. at 586, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279. Under such circumstances,
the court explained, it would be unnecessary to imply malice by invoking the felony-
murder rule since the defendant for a base, anti-social motive, with wanton disregard
for human life, performed an act involving a high degree of probability that it would
result in death. Id. at 584, 477 P.2d at 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
21. People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1966).
22. People v. Reed, 270 Cal. App.2d 37, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969).
23. Brook-s v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. App. 2d 538, 48 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1966).
24. 3 Cal. 3d at 586, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 [1971], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol5/iss3/9
CASE COMMENTS
is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession
of another, ... accomplished by means of force or fear." .. . The
threat thus has no independent significance, no purpose other
than to facilitate the commission of the robbery. It is, in short,
a necessary incident of the crime.25
Justice Peters went so far as to label the majority opinion as a
desire to overrule the Washington decision sub silentio,2 6 pointing out
the absurdity of the distinction made between the Washington and
Taylor cases:
[I]t is too obvious to dispute that inherent in the brandishing
of a gun in a robbery is the conditional threat of the robber
that he will use the gun if his demands are not complied with.
The fact that the robber makes his threat express does not
serve to distinguish Washington. It is unreasonable to assume
that, just because the robber in Washington did not articulate
his threat, the victim in that case had less reason to fear for
his safety or, as the majority assert, less "provocation" for
shooting the robber than did the victims in the instant case.27
Very simply, then, the dissent concluded that a robber who merely
articulates his conditional threats does not engage in a greater degree
of anti-social conduct than robbers who are less bold and vociferous.
Since the conduct of Taylor and his accomplices did not substantially
increase the risk of harm to the victims, the dissenters believed it was
unjust to impose a murder conviction upon Taylor.
THE IMPACT OF THE TAYLOR CASE
In its refusal to reverse the defendant's conviction, the Supreme
Court of California has sacrificed logic and ignored recent developments
in the criminal law in order to reach a desired result.28 The court
clearly re-established the proximate cause theory that was rejected in the
Redline, Myers and Washington decisions and has applied it vicariously.
The majority opinion openly states that the petitioner may be convicted
of first degree murder "[i]f the trier of fact concludes that under the
particular circumstances of the instant case Smith's death proximately
25. Id. at 598, 477 P2d at 141, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
26. Id. at 594, 477 P.2d at 139, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
27. Id. at 592, 477 P.2d at 138, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
28. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
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resulted from the acts of petitioner's accomplices done with conscious
disregard for human life." 9
Rather than limiting the scope of the felony-murder rule, the
Taylor decision and its "vicarious murder theory" manage to reach
extraordinary results without having to invoke the shaky rule itself.
According to such a theory of criminal liability, the act of killing as well
as the malice essential for murder can be implied from a robber's acts
and can be applied vicariously from one robber to another. Under the
guise of requiring a closer causal connection between the defendant's
acts and the resulting death, the California Supreme Court has taken a
"very relaxed view of [that] necessary causal connection," contrary
to the explicit cautions it laid out in Washington.0 While Taylor
would have been absolved of all guilt for the killing according to the
reasoning of the Washington decision, he is now held guilty of murder
under the "vicarious liability theory" as extended in the Taylor case.
It seems that an accomplice to a robbery in California will now be liable
for the malicious mannerisms of his co-felons and will be held responsible
for the over-reaction of the robbery victim.
The Taylor decision is equally harsh and faulty when viewed from
a sociological point of view. Punishing the defendant for largely for-
tuitous circumstances is a concept repugnant to criminal law principles
and cannot benefit society in any meaningful way. To hold felons re-
sponsible for circumstances beyond their control would only deter robbery
haphazardly at best. According to Holmes, "the wise policy is not to
punish the fortuity, but rather to impose severe penalties on those types
of criminal activity which experience has demonstrated carry a high
degree of risk to human life."'" Thus it seems logical that robbery
would be more effectively deterred by increasing the penalties for armed
crimes or the taking of hostages as in the "shield" cases than by punish-
ing robbers for the possible response of their victims. By imposing upon
the defendant a punishment grossly disproportionate to the extent of
his culpability, the California Supreme Court has served no useful
social purpose and has regressed in its interpretation of criminal justice.
29. 3 Cal. 3d at 584, 477 P.2d at 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (emphasis added).
30. See People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442, 446 n.2 (1965).
31. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 226, 261 A.2d 550, 554
(1970), quoting 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1881).
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